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STUDENT NOTES
is necessary for the corporate welfare. Our hardest problem, then.
since our court is in substantial accord with the majority rule on
all these points, is to discover exactly what that rule is, since it
often appears that there are two equally strong rules on a point.2 2
C. A. P., JR.
DISJUNCTIVE ALLEGATIONS IN INDICTIVIENTS
AND VARIANCE BETWEEN ALLEGATIONS
AND PROOF
The Constitution of West Virginia, following in substance the
provision of the Constitution of the United States' and the consti-
tutions of the several states, guarantees that in trials of crimes and
misdemeanors ".. . . the accused shall be fully and plainly in-
formed of the character and cause of the accusation ... ."2 The
reasons generally given for this provision are that the accused is
entitled to know with certainty what offense is charged so that he
may prepare an adequate defense and not be taken by surprise by
evidence offered at the trial, and that he is entitled to have the
offense so charged that upon acquittal or conviction he may plead
the same in bar of a subsequent proceeding for the same offense
and establish his plea by production of the former record. This
note will touch, in this connection, on disjunctive allegations in
indictments and variance between allegations and proof.
Under such guaranty, most courts hold, and our court has
held,4 that an indictment ' which charges an offense, using the
22 The recent United States Supreme Court case of Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936) raises a question as to
whether the court will follow Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U. S. 331, 15 L. ed. 401
(1866) (a stockholder's suit lies to force the corporation to resist payment
of any illegal tax, however slight in its effect), or Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.
S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881) (the exercise of sound business policy by the
directors may not be complained of in a stockholder's suit, whether they have
failed to enforce all corporate rights or not). It is probable that the West
Virginia court, pursuing a realistic policy, would follow Hawes v. Oakland,
which states a sound rule for the general welfare of the corporation. It has
been cited with approval in several West Virginia cases. [Rathbone v. Gas
Co., 31 W. Va. 798, 8 S. E. 570 (1888).]
'U. S. CoNsr. Amend. VI.
2 W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.
3 Berger' v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629 (1935); Clifford v.
State, 29 Wis. 327 (1871).
4 State v. Charlton, 11 W. Va. 332, 27 Am. Rep. 603 (1877) ; State v. Miller,
68 W. Va. 38, 69 S. E. 365 (1910); State v. Dawson, 184 S. E. 253 (W. Va.
1936), the latter case holding that the full information must be in the indict-
ment, and that what the accused may draw from adventitious circumstances
does not count.
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alternative conjunction "or", thereby creating uncertainty, is
fatally defective.6 This is true even though the statute enumerates
the acts or intents constituting the offense disjunctively, so that
if the indictment charges more than one act or intent it must charge
them conjunctively 7 unless they are repugnant,8 and conviction
may be had upon proof of so many of the averments as show a sub-
stantive offense. 9
But there are several well-established exceptions to the general
rule. (1) If the words stated in the alternative are synonymous,
"or" being used in the sense of "to-wit", the indictment may be
good.10  (2) "Or" may be used in enumerating negative averments
required to exclude exceptions set forth in a statute.1 (3) The
use of "or" is sometimes specially provided for in statutory forms
of indictment. 2 But since the objection to the disjunctive is con-
stitutional, a statutory form should have no force to alter a decision
on the point.3 West Virginia and Virginia recognize a fourth
exception, that in liquor license cases the allegation of various
kinds of liquor, but no other allegation,' 4 may be stated dis-
GThe word "indictment", as used in this note, will comprehend indict-
ments, presentments, informations, warrants, and any other forms of criminal
charge.
a Com. v. Grey, 68 Mass. 501, 61 Am. Dee. 476 (1854); Myslewitz v. Sulli-
van, 102 N. J. L. 61, 131 Atl. 57 (1925). These cases are representative of a
long line of decisions.
7State v. Merico, 77 W. Va. 314, 87 S. E. 370 (1915). In Wingard v. State,
13 Ga. 396 (1853), it was held that as to misdemeanors, where only one offense
was charged by reciting the entire statute, the state cannot be forced to elect.
8 State v. Flint, 62 Mo. 393 (1876).
9 Angel v. Com., 4 Va. 212 (1819) ; State v. Bresee, 137 Iowa 673, 114 N. W.
45, 24 L. R. A. (x. s.) 103 (1907); Sauer v. State, 166 Miss. 507, 144 So. 225
(1932).
10 State v. Matthews, 184 S. E. 665 (W. Va. 1936); People v. Jackson, 181
Ill. App. 713 (1913); State v. Bragg, 220 S. W. 25 (Mo. App. 1920). It is
interesting to note that in State v. Newson, 13 W. Va. 859 (1878), "pistol or
revolver" was held good, while in State v. Green, 50 Tenn. 112 (1871), "belt,
or pocket pistol, or revolver" was held bad.
In State v. Dawson, 184 S. E. 253 (W. Va. 1936), it was said that "or"
cannot be used between things merely of the same generic nature, for, since
all statutes must be about things of the same generic nature, then any dis-
junctive indictment would be good.
"'People v. Ellis, 185 Ill. App. 417 (1914) ; State v. Burns, 20 N. H. 550
(1847).
cGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, 7 So. 35, 16 Am. St. Rep. 25 (1889).
13In Scott v. Harshbarger, 116 W. V& 300, 180 S. E. 187 (1935), the fact
that the indictment followed a statutory form did not keep it from being
fatally defective for omission of a material element of the offense.
'4 State v. Charlton, 11 W. Va. 332, 27 Am. Rep. 603 (1877), refused to
extend the rule in Morgan v. Com., 48 Va. 310 (1850), cited n. 15, infra, to a
charge for liquor sold "in, upon, or about the building or premises", holding
it bad.
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junctively." In other jurisdictions, however, the general rule is
applied here as in other cases.' 6
An examination of most of the cases in point shows that courts
usually find that uncertainty is the result of a use of the dis-
junctive, save in the exceptions mentioned. But some decisions,
which easily might have applied the simple rule and held the
charge defective, have held that if the gravamen of the charge
is certainly stated, the fact that "immaterial" or "explanatory"
portions of the charge are in the alternative does not invalidate
it." Such an opinion is that of a majority of the court in the
recent case of State v. Keller."' There a warrant, under our
statute providing that "No person shall .... operate any vehicle
.... while intoxicated, or under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, drugs or narcotics","9 charged defendant with driving
while "intoxicated and under the influence of liquor drugs or nar-
cotics". Upon demurrer by defendant that he was not fully and
plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation
against him, in that the warrant stated the casual agents of intoxi-
cation in the disjunctive, the warrant was held sufficient, on the
ground that the gravamen of the charge was intoxication and that
what caused the intoxication was immaterial and though stated
alternatively was not prejudicial. The rule governing such cases
is stated: "an indictment ought not to state the case disjunctively,
when it is thereby left uncertain what is really intended to be
relied on as the accusation." Two judges dissented, being of the
opinion that such a rule as above stated entirely destroyed the
value of the rule against disjunctive allegations as a means of dis-
covering whether or not uncertainty exists. The minority has
most other courts to support it when it says: "It is not the un-
"5 Cunningham v. State, 5 W. Va. 508 (1872). This case blindly follows
the Virginia cases of Thomas v. Com., 90 Va. 92, 17 S. E. 788 (1893), and
Morgan v. Com., 48 Va. 310 (1850), the latter of which established the ex-
ception, giving no reason therefor. In State v. Miller, 68 W. Va. 38, 69 S. E.
365 (1910), the West Virginia court said Morgan's case, supra, ought not to
be regarded as overthrowing the general rule and must govern only whenever
a case like it arises.
'a Grentham v. State, 89 Ga. 121, 14 S. E. 892 (1892); Clifford v. State, 29
-Wis. 327 (1871).
ir State v. Jarrett, 194 S. E. I (W. Va. 19.37); Dziatkiewicz v. Town of
Maplewood, 115 N. J. L. 37, 178 Atl. 205 (1935); see State v. Dawson, 184
S. E. 253, 256 (W. Va. 1936).
'8 191 S. E. 201 (W. Va. 1937). Two of the majority were dissenters Tiom
the decision in State v. Dawson, 184 S. E. 253 (W. Va. 1936), a case similar
on its facts, in which the indictment was held defective.
19 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 8, § 25.
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certainty that gives rise to the rule; it is the rule that determines
the uncertainty"; thus stating a rule that is certain and easy to
follow.
The constitutional provision quoted above has been construed
to require also that the allegations in a criminal charge and the
proof offered must correspond, for the reasons heretofore given,
especially that of avoidance of surprise, which apply equally to
variance between allegations and proof as to disjunctive alle-
gations. 0 But for a variance to be fatal, it must be material21 and
prejudicial,22 so as to -affect the substantial rights of the accused,
and such a variance arises when an acquittal of defendant under
the indictment would be no bar to a further prosecution for the
same offense 23 or when the proof is so different from the allegations
that the defense prepared turns out to be inapt. Yet there is also
the rule that surplus matter in an indictment need not be proved,24
but an exception to the rule exists where facts unnecessarily alleged
constitute a part of the description of the offense.22 It is generally
agreed that unnecessary words descriptive of concrete things or
persons are not surplusage,' O and must be proved as laid.2 7  In
the case of State v. Myers25 it was charged that defendant made a
felonious assault with a deadly weapon, to-wit, a knife, and con-
viction was had upon proof that the victim was struck with a blunt
instrument. 2 Judgment was reversed by unanimous decision for
the assigned error of variance. The State argued that it was not
so2 Bennett v. United States, 227 U. S. 333, 33 S. Ct. 288 (1913) ; Worsham
v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. 253, 120 S. W. 439, 18 Ann. Cas. 134 (1909); also cases
cited in n. 3, su pra.
a' State v. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805 (1884); State v. Henderson, 29 W.
Va. 147, 1 S. E. 225 (1886) ; State v. Fleshman, 40 W. Va. 726, 22 S. E. 309
(1895); State v. Hill, 48 W. Va. 132, 35 S. E. 831 (1900); Com. v. Butts, 4
Va. 118 (1815) ; Com. v. Butcher, 45 Va. 212 (1847).
22 State v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S. B. 31 (1932).
03 People v. Arras, 89 Cal. 223, 26 Pac. 766 (1891).
24 Hall v. State, 120 Ga. 142, 47 S. . 519 (1904).
125 State v. Herrara, 28 N. M. 155, 207 Pae. 1085 (1922).
20 In Mitchell v. Com., 141 Va. 511, 127 S. E. 368 (1925), the court ex-
pressed the opinion that descriptive allegations that must be proved as laid
are not confined to concrete things or persons, but have a more extended ap-
plication, that is, to words describing, limiting, or qualifying the words neces-
sary to the indictment, and cites People v. Myers, 20 Cal. 76 (1862), and State
v. Flynn, 76 X. J. L. 473, 72 Atl. 296 (1909), in support thereof.
27 State v. Newland, 7 Iowa 242, 71 Am. Dec. 444 (1858) ; Com. v. Magowan,
58 Ky. 368, 71 Am. Dee. 480 (1858); Mitchell v. Com., 141 Va. 541, 127.S. E.
068 (1925).
28 190 S. E. 678 (W. Va. 1937).
20 Probably under W. VA. ]Ev. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 2, § 9.
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necessary to allege the instrument used in the assault,0 so that
its averment might be treated as surplusage. While this is true as
to immaterial averments,"' the court pointed out that there is a
decided difference between an immaterial averment and an aver-
ment that need not be made, the latter of which, while not material
in the sense that leaving it out would make the indictment de-
fective, becomes material by alleging it, 32 because the defendant
is thereby notified and led to believe that he will be safe in accord-
ingly preparing a defense against only what is charged. 83
Thus, West Virginia follows the general authorities as to the
variance rule and a slightly altered rule as to idisjunctive indict-
ments, both of which rules are deeply embedded in the Anglo-
American system of criminal procedure, and rightly so, to make
for certainty and fairness which are necessary in this field of the
law. These protective rules, of course, do not let the accused go
scot free, because by statutory provision3 4 a person acquitted of an
offense on the ground of variance or upon an exception to the form
or substance of an indictment, may be arraigned again on a new
indictment and tried and convicted of the offense,, nothwithstanding
such former acquittal. The interests of both the accused and
society are thereby protected.
J. P. R.
3o This is borne out by State v. Gibson, 67 W. Va. 548, 68 S. E. 295, 28 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 965 (1910). But in Com. v. WVite, 33 Ky. L. 70, 109 S. W. 324
(1908), under a statute against pointing a deadly weapon, the indictment did
not name the weapon, and conviction by proof of use of a .45 cal. pistol was
reversed, the court saying that prosecution may not supplement a defective
charge by sufficient proof, since proof and allegations must agree.
31 Under the rule and exceptions, immaterial averments or true surplusage
seem to be confined to immaterial description of unnecessary allegations.
32 It might be said that the more minute and particular the unnecessary
allegations, the more likely is defendant to be prejudiced by proof varying
therefrom. See cases cited in n. 27, supra.
33 In a similar situation, in Arbetter v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. 487, 186 S. W. 769
(1916), the rule was stated: "If the indictment . . . . alleges the means by
which the assault was committed, such allegation, whether necessary or un-
necessary, being descriptive, must be substantially proved as alleged."
- W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, § 14.
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